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Abstract— Inter-vehicle communication for autonomous ve-
hicles (AVs) stands to provide significant benefits in terms of
perception robustness. We propose a novel approach for AVs
to communicate perceptual observations, tempered by trust
modelling of peers providing reports. Based on the accuracy
of reported object detections as verified locally, communicated
messages can be fused to augment perception performance
beyond line of sight and at great distance from the ego vehicle.
Also presented is a new synthetic dataset which can be used to
test cooperative perception. The TruPercept dataset includes
unreliable and malicious behaviour scenarios to experiment
with some challenges cooperative perception introduces. The
TruPercept runtime and evaluation framework allows modular
component replacement to facilitate ablation studies as well as
the creation of new trust scenarios we are able to show.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cooperative Perception, sometimes referred to as collabo-
rative perception or collective perception [1], is a perception
domain which focuses on fusing information from multiple
agents. Cooperative perception is grounded in the idea that
two or more agents can combine information from their
respective viewpoints to increase perceptual range and ac-
curacy and reduce blind spots caused by occlusions from
one perspective.
State-of-the-art cooperative perception methods typically
assume information received is correct. In real-world situa-
tions this assumption may not hold, and malicious attackers
could take advantage of models which do not incorporate
mechanisms to detect and eliminate false information. Trust
modelling is a field of study which aims to identify un-
trustworthy agents by evaluating the consistency of received
information. Trust modelling has been studied for vehicular
ad hoc networks (VANETs) (e.g., [2]) but never, to the best
of our knowledge, with a focus on cooperative perception.
Our aim is to enable the benefits of cooperative perception:
extended perceptual range, perception of occluded objects,
and increased perceptual accuracy.
The motivation behind using cooperative perception to
increase perceptual accuracy, even in situations where the
object is at least partially visible to the ego-vehicle, arises
from two main ideas: 1) Ensemble Methods: aggregate out-
puts from multiple classifiers to produce scores better than
a single classifier [3]. A hypothesis is introduced that using
detections from multiple vehicles could improve detection
accuracy through similar principles of ensemble learning.
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2) Viewpoint Diversity: Different viewpoints may increase
detection accuracy of objects in view of the ego-vehicle as
a closer, less obstructed, or non-truncated view of an object
can increase the probability of a true positive detection.
The goal is to increase object detection accuracy, even
of objects that are beyond the typical sensor range, which
will in turn increase vehicle, pedestrian, and cyclist safety.
The solution depends on parties being willing to share
information and must not degrade performance (i.e., the
solution must run in real-time).
Existing work in this area is limited, likely due to the
lack of testing data. Current state-of-the-art cooperative
perception methods focus on limited test scenarios (e.g.,
[4]). This makes it difficult to analyze the effect on the
entire perceptual pipeline. Cooperative perception without
conducting a thorough analysis on the potential implications
of malicious agents could lead to danger.
In an endeavor to progress the capabilities and safety of
cooperative perception, we offer two primary contributions:
• A novel method for integrating trust modelling with
cooperative perception into an end-to-end distributed
perception model. Experimental results show an in-
crease of up to 5% Average Precision (AP).
• The TruPercept dataset, which is, to the best of our
knowledge, the first multi-vehicle perspective percep-
tion dataset for AVs gathered in a realistic environment.
The TruPercept dataset is not scenario-based but en-
compasses regular urban driving in a synthetic world.
This will allow researchers to benchmark models for
improving cooperative perception.
These building blocks for effectively understanding trust
modelling with perceptual information are essential for ex-
panding robustness of detection methods and exploiting com-
municated information without leading to overconfidence and
susceptibility to simple attacks.
II. RELATED WORK
Existing state of the art for cooperative vehicles uses
VANETs and various information fusion approaches which
are introduced in this section.
Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) are spontaneous net-
works used for intelligent vehicle communication. VANETs
can be comprised solely of intelligent vehicles (IVs), but
also commonly include road-side units (RSUs) to extend
communication range and a central server for tasks such as
moderating agents or information aggregation and evaluation.
VANETs can be used to transfer information such as traffic
congestion, road conditions, and collision warnings. They
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will also be the communication medium for cooperative
perception. Key issues to address include reliable exchange
of messages, even with low latency (e.g., [5], [6]) and
ensuring the availability of networks for IVs and to optimize
RSU locations ([7]). Correa et al. [8] also show how smart
infrastructure can enhance perceptual range. Map merging to
align views, handling localization between vehicles in case
of GPS failures and increasing accuracy have all been ex-
amined to provide richer solutions ([9], [10], [11]). Aligning
detections shared between vehicles has also been promoted
([12]). Latency and alignment issues are set aside for now,
with our particular model.
Feng et al. exhibit, in their summary of modern object
detection and segmentation networks [13], methods which
utilize information fusion at various stages in the detection
network. Typical fusion methods in 3D object detection
(3DOD) fuse image and LiDAR data. Cooperative perception
also fuses information from multiple sources; however, from
a considerably greater quantity as the sources are nearby
vehicles. With cooperative perception the information shared
can range from raw image and point cloud data to final object
detections or tracks (detections over time).
Arnold et al. [14] use images from multiple perspectives
to reconstruct 3D objects and discuss how this could be used
to better detect relevant 3D objects. Chen et al. [15] fuse raw
point cloud data which they argue is better than images since
there is no need for overlap to perform convolutions. Fusing
raw sensor data provides more information to detection
networks at the cost of increased bandwidth requirement and
latency.
Correa et al. [8] say perception performance can be en-
hanced by transporting detection results (late fusion) instead
of raw data. They point to two standardized message trans-
portation protocols for late fusion; the Cooperative Aware-
ness Message (CAM) [16] and the Collective Perception
Message (CPM) [17]. Hobert et al. [18] discuss some of
the limitations and recommendations for CAMs [16]. Obst
et al. [4] combine tracks from multiple vehicles to increase
detection of vehicles that are out of the sensor field of view,
which can facilitate detecting and tracking vehicles that enter
into view.
Unfortunately, there is no standard to compare autonomous
vehicle cooperative perception methods. Chen et al. [15] test
their method by concatenating point clouds from the same
vehicle of a KITTI scene at two different times. Other works
typically use scenario-based test cases and do not include
quantitative metrics for large regular driving situations.
Furthermore, there is no guarantee that information re-
ceived from other vehicles is correct. The cooperative per-
ception methods discussed do not take this into account,
which introduces a huge security flaw. A vehicle could
disseminate false information unintentionally, for example by
using a poorly performing perceptual network, or malicious
information could be spread with the intention of causing
harm. To prevent this, a central server or authority can be
included in VANET system models, often assisting with trust
certificates to authenticate trustworthiness ([19], [20]). Many
trust models include information relayed through vehicles to
RSUs then onto the central server; accuracy of information
can then be determined if authority-provided ground truth is
acquired. Without a central authority (or one unable to obtain
ground truth), a trust modelling component then becomes
paramount to introduce (e.g., [21], [22]).
III. TRUPERCEPT MODEL
Inspired by related work, this section outlines a novel in-
tegrative approach to perception and trust for AV perception.
A. Perception
There are many computer vision models designed for
3DOD in AVs such as [23] and [24], which can be inter-
changed within the TruPercept system. An object instance,
denoted as θ, is detailed with a class (vehicle, pedestrian,
cyclist), 3D position relative to on-board GPS (x, y, z ∈ R3),
3D bounding box dimensions (width, height, length ∈ R3),
heading (rotation around up axis ∈ {−pi, pi}), and a score.
The set of all possible detections is denoted Θ so that θ ∈ Θ.
The ego-vehicle, the perspective the model is defined from,
is denoted as α and a superscript is used to denote agent
perspective (i.e., Θα are the local detections output by α).
Detections and their evaluations will be broadcast to nearby
vehicles, which can determine to rebroadcast if the message
is within a preset range and time period.
B. Detection Evaluation
Judging trustworthiness of reports received from peers is
often calculated by evaluating messages against ground truth
data. For 3DOD ground truth data is true information (θ)
for each object in range, which, if available, would make
perceptual pipelines unnecessary. Instead, each vehicle will
evaluate each detection it receives with the information from
its perspective. The following function definitions are used:
• IoU: Θ × Θ → [0, 1]: Returns the Intersection over
Union (IoU) of two 3D bounding boxes.
• sv : Θ → [0, 1]: Returns the detection score of a
detection from a vehicle v which attempts to represent
confidence [23] or probability [25] of a true detection.
• ev : Θ → [0, 1] ∪ −1: The evaluation score (from
a vehicle v) of a detection. Evaluation scores should
ideally be probabilistic between 0 and 1, where 0
represents that the detection is incorrect and 1 signifies
the vehicle v is 100% certain the detection is correct.
The ego-vehicle, denoted as α, is already evaluating
whether detections are present or not, within the FoV of
on-board sensors, from a local 3DOD network. It follows
naturally to evaluate received detections on whether or not
they match Θα. Firstly, all received detections are filtered
by local detection area (70 metres 90◦FoV for AVOD [23]
default configuration). Next, received detections are matched
with Θα, producing a set M of sets of matches Θm. A
matching set Θm has a detection from α (if matched),
followed by all matching received detections. Two detections
are considered a match if the IoU is over a threshold param-
eter τ and are the same object class (e.g., car, pedestrian,
cyclist). Each received detection will be matched to the ego-
vehicle detection with which it has the highest IoU. Only
one detection per received vehicle detection list is matched
with any ego-vehicle detection. Any detection θ which α
receives which matches one of its own detections θ′ will
have eα equal to sα(θ′). If there is no match with θ, α will
set eα(θ) to η, a negative evaluation constant. Experiments
are conducted with η set to either 0 or -1. For each received
detection θ, and the detection of α labelled θ′, where θ′ is
the object instance in Θα which has the maximum IoU with
θ, the following applies
eα(θ) =
{
sα(θ′) IoU (θ, θ′) > τ
η otherwise
(1)
Using only the local detection score to evaluate detections
is not sufficient. Objects which are further away, truncated, or
occluded may have lower or η evaluation scores which would
be erroneous evaluations. To solve this problem, another
value which encompasses the visibility of the detection is
proposed using the following definitions:
• pv : Θ → Z≥: the number of points from the perspec-
tive vehicle v LiDAR point cloud Pv which are within
the boundaries of an object θ.
• Φv : Θ → [0, 1]: the visibility value of a detection θ
from a vehicle v. 1 is completely visible and 0 signifies
no knowledge from the current viewpoint.
The true visibility of an object θ from a perspective v is
difficult to calculate and will be approximated by pv(θ). Let
γl and γu be the lower and upper pv(θ) limits for min/max
visibility respectively. Visibility is calculated as
Φv(θ) = min
(
1,
max (0, pv(θ)− γl)
γu − γl
)
(2)
If there are no points residing in the 3D bounding box then
the object is likely obstructed and the visibility value will
be set to 0 (the vehicle is completely unsure as to whether
the received detection is correct or not). This follows the
assumption that the more LiDAR points that return from
an object, the higher the chance the 3DOD algorithm has
of detecting it. Thus, the visibility score can be used as a
means to estimate the confidence that there is no object for
a negative (i.e., unmatched) detection evaluation.
C. Trust
It can also be beneficial to evaluate the total information
flow from a vehicle. For example, if a vehicle is broadcasting
malicious information, the vehicle should be identified, so
it can be ignored and appropriate measures can be taken.
Trust calculation can be done centrally or by each vehicle.
Central aggregation introduces a strong system requirement
(central server), but is better as vehicles only enter within
proximity of each other for short time periods (≈ 15 seconds
average in the TruPercept data). Trust values are calculated
for each object and then vehicle on the central server and then
periodically broadcast so vehicles may use the information
while integrating detections from other vehicles.
The trust T for a detection θα will be denoted as T (θα)
and will be aggregated using evaluations from all nearby
vehicles V which received the detection θα (V excludes α).
The evaluation from each vehicle v ∈ V will be aggregated
in proportion to how visible the detection is from each
evaluator perspective v (i.e., Φv(θ)). Let the trust function
for a detection from the ego-vehicle θα be T : Θ→ [0, 1].
T (θα) =
∑
v∈V
Φv(θα) · ev(θα)∑
v∈V
Φv(θα)
(3)
The trust value for a vehicle v is calculated on a central
server by aggregating the trust feedback from all detections
that vehicle has sent in proportion to the local detection score
for each detection. Up to this point, we have done everything
instantaneously, but trust is calculated over time. Let Θαt be
Θα from a time step t. Let Bα be the set of all detections
from Θαt for every t ∈ [−f, 0], where f is the freshness
length. Let the trust function for vehicles be T : B → [0, 1].
Then the trust for α is
T (Bα) =
∑
θ∈Bα
sα(θ) · T (θ)∑
θ∈Bα
sα(θ)
(4)
D. Detection Aggregation
A final aggregation step (at each vehicle) produces a
score ω for every matching set Θm ∈ M where θmi is
the ith detection θ ∈ Θm. There are several inputs to
this stage: evaluations ev(θ), visibility Φv(θ), and trust of
evaluator T (Bv). Let the score function for a final detection
be ω : Θm → [0, 1].
1) Weighted Average: A simple aggregation system which
uses a weighted average calculates final scores as
ωα(Θm) =
∑
θv∈θm
Φv(θv) · T (Bv) · ev(θv)∑
θv∈Θm
Φv(θv) · T (Bv) (5)
η = 0 for this method so that ω(Θm) ∈ [0, 1].
2) Additive (Positive and Negative): The weighted av-
erage method is able to quantify the belief an object is
present relative to the trust and visibility of the object.
However, it does not account for the quantity of vehicles
which perceived the object. It is expected that the higher
the ratio of vehicles which perceive a visible object, the
likelier the object is to exist. The additive aggregation adds to
the final detection score for every vehicle which perceived
the object and subtracts for every vehicle from which the
object was not perceived (unmatched). η = −1 to create
the positive/negative addition/subtraction mechanism. The
aggregation is weighted by the object visibility Φv(θ) and
trustworthiness T v of each evaluator v. The final score is
ωα(Θm) =
∑
θv∈Θm
Φv(θv) · T (Bv) · ev(θv) (6)
The resulting value of equation 6 is not bounded
by 0 or 1; it is later bounded using ωα(Θm) =
min (1,max (0, ωα(Θm))). Trust value for the ego-vehicle
should be set to 1, or higher than 1 if bias towards the ego-
vehicle detections is desired.
E. Plausibility Checker
Thus far, the message evaluation relies on visibility of
objects. This could be taken advantage of if a malicious agent
were to insert false detections where there are no points.
For example, false detections are inserted half a meter off
the ground in front of vehicles where there is open air. No
LiDAR points would be registered and the visibility value
would be calculated as zero even though the non-object is
visible. If there are points behind the object, and no points in
front or within the object bounding box, then the existence of
the object is false with high confidence. Obst et al. [4] create
a mechanism for determining false tracks for cooperative
perception and use the term plausibility checker.
The TruPercept system incorporates a novel plausibility
checker which performs a frustum cull on the point cloud.
The frustum is centered to the object center and extends a
quarter of the smallest dimension (width or length) to the
top, bottom, left, and right. If more than 10% of the points
are closer than the object center, it is considered plausible.
The plausibility check can be performed in two key spots:
1) During message evaluation it can provide strong negative
evaluations instead of not contributing to the evaluation due
to low/zero visibility. 2) After aggregating detections to
remove any detections which were erroneously aggregated
to scores higher than zero.
F. TruPercept Summary
The TruPercept system has the following detection and
decision-making cycle on the ego-vehicle α: obtain sensor
data; run the detection network to obtain Θα; broadcast Θα;
receive Θv ∀ v ∈ V or stop at timeout t; calculate M;
calculate and broadcast p(θ), e(θ) ∀ θ ∈ Θv, v ∈ V ; receive
p(θ), e(θ) ∀ θ ∈ Θv, v ∈ V or stop at timeout t; calculate
ω(Θm) ∀ Θm ∈M.
The central server receives vehicle broadcasts of e(θ) and
updates T (θ) and T (Bv) ∀ θ ∈ Bv, v ∈ V ∪α which it then
periodically broadcasts.
IV. THE TRUPERCEPT DATASET
Ideally, data would be collected from the real-world,
as it would most accurately represent autonomous driving
conditions; however, collecting data from the real-world for
cooperative perception has resulted only in limited test-case
scenarios. To the best of our knowledge, there are no ex-
isting publicly available real-world or synthetic cooperative
perception datasets for autonomous driving encompassing
regular driving. Creating a real-world dataset would require
a fleet of vehicles equipped with autonomous sensor systems
simultaneously collecting data.
Trust modelling for V2V are often evaluated through the
use of simulation software. Chen et al. [19] use OMNET++
[26] for V2V communication and SUMO [27] for road traffic
simulation. However, these simulators do not contain sensory
level perceptual information. Simulators such as CARLA
[28] are a viable options as they can obtain synthetic percep-
tual data and attempt to simulate traffic flow. Alternatively,
Grand Theft Auto V (GTA V) is a video game which contains
realistic graphics and has been used to generate synthetic
data in a diverse environment for AV perception [29]. Recent
efforts have even created an in-game LiDAR point cloud
generator [30]. Hurl et al. [31] extend the range of [30] and
improve the accuracy of point clouds for pedestrians. The
PreSIL dataset [31] produces the necessary data for 3DOD
for autonomous driving and has been shown to increase
performance on state-of-the-art 3DOD networks.
The TruPercept dataset uses the PreSIL generation method
[31] and consists of two series of captures, spanning ap-
proximately 300 and 400 seconds respectively. The data is
captured at 1 Hz and contains identical data to the PreSIL
dataset for the ego-vehicle and each vehicle within a 100
metre radius. A 100 metre radius is used to restrict the total
number of vehicles. Ideally, 160m will be used as the LiDAR
scanner used for the PreSIL dataset has a max range of 80m
so vehicles must be within double the max LiDAR range
to have overlapping point coverage areas and thus obtain
matching detections. The data is captured over two routes
through urban environments.
V. QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS
A. Scenario 1: Algorithm Analysis Using a Single-Frame
A scenario was constructed to evaluate qualitatively
whether the novel cooperative perception solution can detect
a completely occluded object and filter out a malicious
detection. The scenario contains the ego-vehicle passing by
a parked truck. A pedestrian, occluded from the ego-vehicle
perspective, is walking out from behind the truck attempting
to illegally cross the road. Another vehicle moving in the
opposite direction of the ego-vehicle has a clear line of
sight to the pedestrian. A false detection in a dangerous
location (less than 10m away, directly in its trajectory, and
oncoming) for the ego-vehicle is inserted into the broadcast
of the oncoming vehicle. The false detection is given a high
detection score (1.0) in an attempt to fool the ego-vehicle.
The TruPercept cooperative message evaluation mecha-
nism is able to correctly detect the pedestrian which is
occluded from the ego-vehicle perspective. Unfortunately
the false detection, although the score is decreased, is still
present. However, if the plausibility checker is also run, it
can eliminate the possibility that the false detection exists
while still maintaining the pedestrian which is occluded.
The image and a top-down view of the LiDAR point cloud,
obtained from the ego-vehicle perspective, is displayed in
Figure 1 along with detections from each car and final
outputs. The false detection is completely removed and the
occluded pedestrian is detected.
B. Scenario 2: Vehicle Trust
This experiment attempts to show that the TruPercept
model can correctly identify a malicious vehicle. Trust is
accrued over time by the evaluations of peers. To mimic this,
Fig. 1. Top: Ego-vehicle image and point cloud of scenario 1. Middle: Ego-
vehicle (left) and oncoming vehicle detections (right). Oncoming vehicle has
inserted a false detection in front of the ego-vehicle. Bottom: Cooperative
perception results without (left) and with (right) the plausibility checker.
Ground truth is shown in green, detection score on boxes.
the single frame from the previous scenario is replicated 100
times and the trust score is examined at various instances in
time. The false detections are inserted after 50 frames so
the vehicle has time to build up trust. A freshness timeout
f = 50 frames is used so that any evaluation further than
50 frames in the past is discarded and not used towards the
vehicle trust. A secondary situation is introduced where the
oncoming vehicle places three false detections to compare
when there is more false information.
The trust for the ego-vehicle remains at 0.82. For the
malicious vehicle, the trust value begins at 0.81 and decreases
to 0.15 by frame 100. When three false vehicles are added
the trust value decreases faster and balances out at zero.
Trustworthy vehicles remain unchanged, thus the TruPercept
algorithm was able to correctly identify the malicious vehi-
cle. Note that there is a third vehicle not depicted in the scene
images which has a clear view of all objects in the scene but
is further away. It contributes to the positive detection of the
occluded pedestrian and has a trust score of 0.97.
VI. QUANTITATIVE EXPERIMENTS
This analysis shows quantifiable effects of using coop-
erative perception on the general perceptual pipeline. The
TruPercept dataset is, to the best of our knowledge, the
first of its kind, and enables cooperative perception model
evaluation on regular driving data. The KITTI evaluation
criteria of easy, moderate, and hard are defined by limiting
values on occlusion, truncation, and minimum height (in
pixels) of objects. This scope is too narrow, as cooperative
perception allows detection of objects which are completely
occluded, truncated, or are far in the distance. To provide a
deeper inspection, the ‘All’ criteria, which encompasses any
object within the forward facing 90 degree FoV area up to
140 metres away, is also evaluated.
A. Cooperative vs. Local Perception
The first experiment is designed to evaluate if the Tru-
Percept model improves upon single perspective methods.
AVOD [23], a state-of-the-art 3D object detector, is trained
using the PreSIL dataset [31] and the mean AP score on
the TruPercept data is used as a baseline. Next, AVOD is
run for every nearby vehicle (within a 100m radius), and the
TruPercept model is run to obtain updated scores. The scores
of these methods are displayed in Table I. Several variations
of TruPercept are 1) Weighted Average, η = 0 2) Summed
Positive and Negative, η = −1 3) Local detections were
used primarily. Any non-matching TruPercept 2 detection θ
is used if, from the ego-vehicle perspective v, Φv(θ) < 10
and the plausibility check returns true. For shown results
τ = 0.1, γl = 0, γu = 100 for cars, and 40 for pedestrians.
TABLE I
RESULTS: TRUPERCEPT (% AP)
Car Pedestrian
Method Easy Mod. Hard All Easy Mod. Hard All
AVOD 66.8 62.8 52.1 36.3 84.2 78.7 75.1 57.3
TruPercept 1 54.6 48.9 43.9 31.5 76.7 68.7 70.0 54.0
TruPercept 2 57.2 51.4 46.0 32.8 78.6 70.4 71.4 55.0
TruPercept 3 64.8 62.1 51.1 36.7 83.4 78.8 75.8 58.5
The most important insight is that none of the tested
methods improve the perceptual accuracy by a meaningful
margin over the local perception methods. This shows the
importance of testing any modules which are added to the
perceptual track with the entire system instead of only sce-
narios. Two plausible explanations for the poor TruPercept
results are: 1) The alignment issues with the synthetic data
could reduce performance for cooperative, but not local, per-
ception. 2) Each perspective can introduce false detections,
when aggregating between multiple vehicles this could result
in more false positives. By investigating the precision-recall
curves for several of the models it is evident that for many
of the poorly performing cooperative perception models the
precision is much lower. This is especially true for lower
recall values, likely caused by false detections from nearby
vehicles being inserted with high scores.
One point to note is that pedestrians have higher detection
scores than cars, a reversal from typical real-world data. This
could be from pedestrian bounding boxes having identical
sizes in the PreSIL data, making regression easier. The
PreSIL data also has larger quantities of vehicles such as
trucks, busses, and SUVs which are not part of the ‘Car’
class. This could cause confusion for a detection network
which is only attempting to label cars, resulting in more
false positives. This could be rectified by training a network
to detect all classes.
B. Position and Orientation
The hypothesis is that vehicles which are closer to an
object will provide more accurate positioning and orientation
information. This could lead to increased accuracy if objects
which are detected are not meeting the KITTI standard of
0.5 IoU to be a true positive. For this experiment, the local
AVOD detections have the position and orientation set to that
of the closest detecting vehicle in each matching detections
list. Results in Table II show an increase in AP of up to 5%. It
is revealing that the largest improvement to local perception
is gained simply by modifying the position and orientation
of local detections. This enables the model to ignore false
positives from nearby vehicles and yet still improve the
accuracy of local detections.
TABLE II
RESULTS: UPDATED POSITION/ORIENTATION (% AP)
Car Pedestrian
Method Easy Mod. Hard All Easy Mod. Hard All
AVOD 66.8 62.8 52.1 36.3 84.2 78.7 75.1 57.3
Corrected 69.5 61.0 54.1 37.8 89.0 80.6 80.1 61.0
C. Trust Levels
The previous experiments evaluated detections from hon-
est (although potentially not correct) vehicles. This experi-
ment augments the dataset with malicious and unreliable ve-
hicles to evaluate the performance of the TruPercept models,
while being exposed to entities with non-optimal behaviours.
• Trustworthy: detections are taken from the output of the
local detection network. Results in Table I.
• Unreliable: for each local detection, 10% chance to
remove, 10% add a randomly positioned detection.
• Malicious: a vehicle and pedestrian are inserted in front
of the ego-vehicle for every frame from 10% of vehicles.
Full results are available with the dataset. The car class
shows a significant performance reduction ( 10%) when in-
troducing the unreliable behaviours. Strangely, the pedestrian
class actually improves in all categories for the TruPercept
models. If the unreliable vehicles had bad detections to
begin with, the final score of these detections could be
reduced. Furthermore, false detections also have a chance
to be removed, these could be harder to identify as false
detections since they will be located where points are, instead
of random locations which could contain no points. The
malicious detections decrease the performance significantly,
even for pedestrians. The malicious detections behaviour
represents a coordinated attack between 10% of the vehicles
specifically targeted towards the ego-vehicle. This shows a
weakness in the model towards coordinated attacks.
The mean trust values at the termination of the exper-
iments were: 0.27 trustworthy, 0.25 unreliable, and 0.13
malicious. The trust value for unreliable vehicles is not
significantly different than trustworthy vehicles. It is likely
that behaviours such as the unreliable behaviour, which
mostly present true detections, will be able to fool the
current system. The trust model was able to detect blatantly
malicious behaviour with a much higher success. Average
trust values are fairly low, likely due to the amount of
false positives which are being forwarded. If local detection
accuracy increases, trust values would be expected to in-
crease. These behaviours are simply a glimpse at strategies
malicious entities could employ. In the future, great effort
should be placed on creating and testing behaviours which
could precipitate dangerous situations.
VII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In the future, we can imagine expanding our trust model-
ing, inspired by the work of VANETs researchers, such as
supporting role-based trust modeling (e.g., police cars with
greater initial trustworthiness) (as in [32], [33]) or adding
incentives for honest reporting ([2], [33]). Zhang et al. [32]
also suggest that clustering methods may help to reduce false
information spread. We note that since objects are naturally
geographically clustered, relay control groups come to mind;
by integrating this into the TruPercept solution, information
could perhaps be drastically reduced (e.g., one score per
matching object group). This is an avenue for future work.
Other researchers have new ideas for the use of a central
server to deal with malicious entities (e.g., Li et al.’s [20]
reputation-based announcement system which aggregates re-
ports by reputation score). This may suggest an expanded
role for our central system. More sophisticated trust mod-
elling using Bayesian methods and Partially Observable
Markov Decision Processes (POMDPs) are another area of
study (e.g., Raya’s system [34] which allows not knowing
about events, Zhang et al. [19]’s use of partially observable
Markov decision processes to enable dynamic updates). One
way in which we could try for expanded trust modelling
would be considering each new object in our framework
with a POMDP. Allowing more uncertainty about vehicles
is advocated by Balkrishan [35] though their context is
MANETs, while Souissi et al. [36] suggest more potential
by examining similarity of messages received from different
sources, which may help to determine the risk of believing
a given report. These are other possible directions for richer
trust modelling components.
In conclusion, multiple trust modelling methods for ad
hoc networks were presented, with a majority being used for
VANETs. The topic was evaluated from a new perspective:
integration with 3DOD. A multi-agent solution attempting to
increase 3DOD range and accuracy for AVs was presented.
The TruPercept dataset, including all trust scenarios, as well
as all tools, evaluation, and model code are publicly available
at https://tinyurl.com/y2nwy52o.
Four broader-scoped takeaways are: 1) Cooperative per-
ception can be used to more accurately localize objects.
2) Cooperative perception creates a gargantuan security
flaw for AVs since the correctness of incoming information
cannot be guaranteed. 3) Cooperative perception techniques
need to incorporate trust modelling or incoming information
evaluation. It is fairly easy to concoct situations which could
cause an AV to act erratically and create dangerous situations.
4) Cooperative perception methods should be integrated
into perceptual pipelines then evaluated on large datasets.
Creating a module to prevent a contrived scenario from
occurring is not necessarily hard. Integrating modules into
complex perceptual systems to improve overall performance
and prevent a plethora of prospectively hazardous scenarios
is a more onerous task.
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